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Abstract. We study a model of traffic where drivers adopt different behavioral strategies. These can be cooperative or
defective according to a driver abiding or not by a traffic rule. Drivers can change their strategy by imitating the majority,
with a rule that depends on the strategies with which they have interacted. These interactions occur at intersections,
where vehicles pay a temporal cost according to their strategy. We analyze the conditions under which different strategy
compositions represent an advantage in the system velocity. We found that the cooperators’ mean speed is higher than
the defectors’ even when the vehicle density is large. However, defectors can obtain benefits in their mean speed when
they are a minority in an essentially cooperative population. The presence of a core of educated drivers, who persist
firmly in a cooperative behavior, optimizes the speed in the system, especially for intermediate values of vehicular
density and higher temporal costs.
PACS. 89.65.-a Tansportation; urban traffic – 02.50.Le Game theory – 02.70.-c Computational techniques; simula-
tions
1 Introduction
Vehicular traffic dynamics has received considerable attention
since, at least, the middle of the twentieth century. In the decades
that followed different points of view have been used to tackle
different features of the many problems associated with traffic.
The interest of these hardly needs justification: the many as-
pects of traffic have enormous impact in our civilization, with
applications in many fields, ranging from engineering to the
social sciences. The volume of traffic flow has quickly over-
passed the capacity of the cities and highways, once and again,
country after country, making the understanding of its dynamic
an imperative in many societies. The problems of infrastruc-
ture and urban development able to accommodate an increas-
ing flow range reside at one end of the spectrum. At the other
end there are aspects of education, social planning and law en-
forcement, aiming at helping the flow in the best interest of the
society. Many other ancillary problems lay in between: con-
gestion, pollution management (including noise and vibration),
optimization of energetic resources, economics, reduction of
accidents and casualties, parking, public transportation alter-
natives, remote monitoring, robotization, etc.
The complex spectrum of mathematical traffic models is
well documented in the reviews by Helbing and Chowdhury
[1,2]. The influential works of Lighthill and Whitham [3], and
then of Richards [4], are based on a macroscopic approach
in which traffic is considered a continuous medium—like a
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fluid—characterized by a spatial density and a velocity field.
On a different vein, “microscopic” models that treat the mo-
tion of each vehicle separately have been developed as a par-
allel line of research. Microscopic models emphasize the role
played by the (non linear) interactions between vehicles. The
interest of physicists in traffic problems received an enormous
boost with the work of Nagel and Schreckenberg [5]. There ex-
ist very detailed microscopic models that serve the purpose of
analyzing mostly local situations. Such level of detail is still
prohibitive in the study of large scale features of traffic flow.
Nagel-Schreckenberg models and others, on the other hand, ex-
ploit the more manageable representation of traffic as cellular
automata.
In this work we present a bidimensional model of traffic
where drivers operate with different behavioral strategies. In
this framework we introduce a dynamic of imitation based on
the types of strategies faced by drivers at each intersection of
a city. Our aim is to get an insight about how the interaction
between drivers with distinctive behaviors can influence a 2D
[6] traffic flow. Specifically, we study a system where part of
the agents respects a traffic rule, while others ignore it. It is a
very common situation in many countries with poor traffic edu-
cation, from which an imitation behavior, “do as the others do,”
usually emerges. In such a context, we explore the effect that
the introduction of a core of “well educated” drivers, abiding
by the law, affects the collective behavior and the efficiency of
the system in terms of, for example, speed.
In the vast literature on traffic there are few studies which
use the tools of game theory. Yet, the behavior of drivers can
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easily and adequately be treated as a strategy in the game the-
oretical sense. The framework we follow in the present work
is reminiscent of other studies in the dynamics of pedestrians
[7,8,9]. In particular, Baek et al. [10] have analyzed a cellular
automaton where agents move along a passageway in both di-
rections. When encountering other agents they take a step to the
right with probability p and to the left with probability 1− p. In
this way, they play a coordination game in which two strategies
are considered: traffic rule abiders and traffic rule ignorers.
Other game theoretical approaches have been applied on
networks of transportation approached from an economic point
of view [11,12]. Certainly, there are many instances were the
mathematics of cooperating and defecting strategies, of imita-
tion and education, can be applied in traffic systems. The ed-
ucation of traffic rules is perhaps the epitome where the need
of reaching a consensus of cooperation in the system produces
a global benefit. A similar problem in a more abstract setting
has been studied in [13], and we aim to applying some of those
ideas here.
2 Model
With the purpose of obtaining an insight of the mechanisms
operating behind the emergent collective patterns, we analyze
a simple model that contains enough ingredients from the real
systems. The model city is a square with straight streets ar-
ranged in a regular lattice. For the sake of simplicity in the
description, imagine that the streets run either in the North-
South direction (the longitudinal streets) or the East-West (the
transversal streets). All streets are one-way, single-lane roads.
The direction of traffic alternates in both sets of streets, as is
usual in many real world situations.
The vehicles are modelled as a cellular automaton. A car
can occupy the space between two intersections, and advance
one block at each time step of the automaton dynamics. Dou-
ble occupancy of the blocks is not allowed: the cars can ad-
vance only if the block ahead is empty. Interaction of cars occur
only at the intersections, in a manner that will be described be-
low. We keep a constant number of vehicles by allowing those
drivers that exit the lattice from a border to reenter the system.
To prevent artifacts that a periodic boundary condition would
produce in the rather small systems we use to mimic the streets
of a real world city, these cars are randomly returned to empty
slots at the border of any street, regardless the street from which
they came out.
The dynamics proceeds in discrete steps. At each step all
the intersections of the city are updated in a random order. The
effect of this is an asynchronous update of the positions of the
vehicles, which prevents some artifacts that a sequential update
produces, especially at high density. A simulation run consists
of the repetition of this update step nL2 times (with usually
n = 100), which provides a reasonable number of interactions
between drivers. We observed that the flow reaches a stationary
state after a short transient, which allowed us to take measure-
ments and time averages during the course of the simulation.
The results shown below correspond, furthermore, to ensemble
averages of 100 such simulation runs.
There is only one traffic rule in the system: drivers shall
give way to vehicles approaching from the right at intersec-
tions. This rule is widely used in countries with right-hand traf-
fic, and applied at all intersections where it is not overridden by
priority signs or traffic signals, neither of which are present in
our model. Drivers are either cooperators (who abide by the
rule, and yield to drivers coming from their right) or defectors
(who ignore the rule).
When two vehicles approach an intersection at the same
time there is an interaction that determines the order of cross-
ing and the time involved. There may be four different situa-
tions according to the drivers’ strategies, as follows. (i) Both
drivers are cooperators. One of them gives way to the other,
who has right of way according to priority of the right. (ii) The
driver coming from the right is a defector, and the other is a
cooperator. This situation is analogous to (i), since the cooper-
ator yields to the defector, and the defector just ignores the rule.
(iii) The cooperator approaches from the right, and the other
driver is a defector. This is the reverse of (ii). The defector does
not yield, while the cooperator assumes his right to cross and
attempts to do it. In this case we suppose that some time is lost
in the fake pass. (iv) Both drivers are defectors. In this situation
we suppose a collision that entails a longer loss of time than in
case (iii). The time that a driver needs to cross the intersection
can be used as a measure of the cost involved in the game situa-
tion, analogous to the payoff of the usual formulation of formal
games. The loss of time that occurs in situations (iii) and (iv)
can be a substantial contribution to the cumulative cost, and can
be interpreted as pass fakes, fines or even crashes. The crosses
actually happen only if the slot just ahead of the intersection is
free. Figure 1 shows a cartoon summarizing the description of
the system.
The costs involved in rules (i) to (iv) are summarized in
the following table, that show the time in units of simulation
steps. A left (right) driver is a driver approaching the intersec-
tion from the left (right) of the other driver. A driver that yields
loses a time step, incurring into a cost of 2 for crossing. The pa-
rameters a and b characterize the delay incurred into in case of
more serious interactions. Observe that, in the interaction (iii),
we assume that both drivers lose the same time, a. This is a sim-
plification of a situation that could be, of course, more complex
in real life. For example, the cooperator might stop completely,
the offending defector cross, and then the cooperator continue
his way. This could be implemented in the present formula-
tion with an additional parameter c > a for the cooperator. A
sensible choice, in the present cellular automaton formulation,
would be c = a+ 1. The results do not change significantly in
such a case, reflecting a robustness of the model with respect
to details that might be difficult to quantify. On the other hand,
one does not sensibly expect that c > a+ 1. Even if one would
allow it, a thorough reformulation of the rules would be neces-
sary to accommodate for the possibility of a vehicle standing
still even when the interacting one has followed his way. In
the present work we prefer to keep the model rules simple, as
formulated.
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Fig. 1. Sketch of a distribution of vehicles in a model city. Cooperators
and defectors are represented by white and grey ovals respectively.
The arrows show the direction of motion of the cars. Dashed arrows
indicate drivers that give way to the other; solid arrows correspond to
drivers that cross (or try to cross) the intersection. The four interac-
tions shown (besides the “free” drivers 9 and 10) correspond to the
four types of encounter of strategies that can occur at intersections.
3 Results
Let us begin with the analysis of systems with quenched strate-
gies. Each driver receives, at the beginning, a strategy that re-
mains unchanged during the course of the simulation. Strate-
gies are randomly drawn, uniformly with a probability pC for
cooperation and its complement 1− pC for defection. The den-
sity of cooperators is then pC, uniformly distributed in the city.
The simulations runs we show below consist of 100L2 time
steps, in a square city of L2/2 intersections, and with a time
step that updates, randomly and asynchronously, as many in-
tersections. After a transient of L2 time steps we measure the
instantaneous average velocity in the system, defined as the ra-
tio of moving vehicles to their total number, and compute the
time average of it, denoted 〈v〉 below. Average velocity of co-
operators and of defectors (〈vC〉 and 〈vD〉) are defined similarly.
Besides, we also measure the average velocity of each vehicle
as the ratio of the number of steps it makes during the simula-
tion, to the total duration. From this ensemble we compute the
distributions P(vC) and P(vD), characterizing the movement of
the two classes of drivers.
3.1 Density dependence
Figure 2 shows the average velocities as a function of vehi-
cle density δ in a 20× 20 square lattice. Two sets of curves
are shown, corresponding to different strategy compositions of
the system. The lowest three curves correspond to a system
with 25% cooperators. The upper three, on the other hand, cor-
respond to a very cooperative system with 75% cooperators.
These two situations provide a good characterization of both
cooperative and non-cooperative ensembles.
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Fig. 2. Mean velocity of the system, of cooperators and of defectors
(〈v〉, 〈vC〉 and 〈vD〉 respectively) as a function of the density of vehi-
cles, δ . We show two different cooperation scenarios, as indicated in
the legend: 25% and 75% of cooperators in the population. The costs
involved in the interactions are a = 3, b = 100. Data are averaged over
100 realizations.
As Fig. 2 shows, the velocity decreases monotonically with
vehicle density. This is so for the system average velocity 〈v〉
as well as for the cooperators and the defectors. Observe, also,
that the average velocity of cooperators is greater than that of
defectors at all densities. This reflects the fact that cooperators
are less prone to the higher costs involved in the violation of
the right hand rule (b ≫ a > 2). Moreover, observe also the
effect of system composition on the average velocity. When the
system is more cooperative, defectors also get a benefit. Indeed,
the velocity of defectors is greater in a system with 75% of
cooperators than that of cooperators in a system with 25% of
cooperators—at least for intermediate densities. We will return
to these matters later on.
We have also computed the distribution of time-averaged
individual velocities, and checked that the mean values shown
in Fig. 2 are a good characterization of them. Figure 3 shows a
typical example. The distributions are bell shaped around their
mean values, with narrow dispersion. Only when the mean val-
ues of cooperators and defectors are very close (as it happens
when the density is high) the distributions show some overlap
as we see in the insert of the Figure 3.
3.2 Imitation dynamics
The results presented in the previous section provide a first step
in our analysis of the dynamics of cooperation and defection in
the simple traffic model. We will now introduce the key ingre-
dient of strategy imitation. Let us suppose that there are two
idiosyncrasies in the drivers. Some of them adopt their driving
strategy not because of conviction or belief in the convenience
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Fig. 3. Distribution of the velocity of cooperators (full curve) and
defectors (dotted curve) for densities δ = 0.2 in the main panel and
δ = 0.8 in the insert. The costs are a = 3, b = 100. Data are averaged
over 100 realizations.
of respecting the traffic rule, but by imitation of other drivers.
It is a common habit in many societies with little enforcement
of the rules and a low level of education of them: “Do as the
other do.” Besides these “imitators,” a core of drivers may well
be bona fide cooperators, representing a small group of drivers
that have been well educated in the traffic rules, and are con-
vinced of their application. These “core cooperators” do not
imitate the strategy of other drivers, and always cooperate.
We implement this imitation dynamics in the following way.
Imitating drivers can change their strategies based on the fre-
quency of encounters with drivers that display one or the other
strategy. Since it is unreasonable that drivers change strategy
too often, the imitation takes place every τ simulation steps,
based on the frequency of interactions during the previous τ
steps. The fraction of encounters with either strategy define the
individual probabilities of imitation:
PC =
fC
fC + fD , (1)
PD = 1− pC, (2)
where fs is the number of interactions with strategy s during
the previous τ steps. Observe that the left driver participating
in encounters of type (i) and (ii)—a cooperator—cannot infer
the strategy of the right driver. They always give way, regard-
less of whether the right driver is a cooperator or a defector.
In these situations, the cooperator adds 0.5 both to fC as fD.
In any other type of encounter each driver is able to infer the
strategy used by the other driver, and will add 1 to fC or to fD
as appropriate. Based on the defined probabilities, drivers can
change their strategy by imitating the majority, if they play the
other strategy:
C → D with probability PD, (3)
D →C with probability PC. (4)
It is reasonable to assume that drivers in a small town tend
to interact with the same drivers over and over again, while
those in a big city do not. In this spirit we have made τ depend
on the size of the city, as L2 simulation steps.
The numerical results show that the dynamics of imitation
establishes a balance between the number of cooperators and
defectors. Independently of the initial conditions, the system
reaches an equilibrium in the composition of strategies. The
average number of cooperators and defectors at the end of the
realizations, with the parameters we used, are 56% and 44%
respectively. Moreover, these same values of equilibrium are
observed even in extreme cases when a single cooperator or
defector is introduced at the beginning of the simulations in
populations in which all other drivers have the opposite strategy
(besides fortuitous extinctions of one of the populations when
it is very small, due to stochastic fluctuations).
This approach to equilibrium can be understood in a mean
field approximation by analyzing a master equation for the prob-
ability densities. Consider the following equation for the prob-
ability density of cooperators:
dρC
dt =W (C|D)ρD−W (D|C)ρC, (5)
where W (S|S′) is the transition probability for a driver with
strategy S′ to switch to S, and ρC and ρD = 1− ρC are the
probability densities of cooperators and defectors respectively
at time t.
Given the lack of discrimination of cooperators driving on
the left at intersections, in a well mixed approximation their
probability to switch to defection is W (D|C) ≈ 1/2. On the
other side, defectors build up a probability of switching to co-
operation based on their encounters with cooperators, so we
have W (C|D) = ρC. With these, Eq. (5) becomes a logistic
equation of the form:
dρC
dt = ρC(1/2−ρC). (6)
The stable equilibrium solution of Eq. (6) is ρ∗C = 1/2, close to
the observed stationary value. Incidentaly, observe that a par-
tial discrimination of the cooperators, of a fraction ε < 1 of the
defectors in their encounters, can be taken into account with a
transition probability of the form W (D|C) = ερD +(1− ε)/2.
It is easy to show that the ensuing logistic equation also has
ρ∗C = 1/2 as only attractor. The timescale of the evolution, how-
ever, becomes dependent on ε as 2(1− ε)−1.
Besides the imitators, we set a fraction fCC of drivers to
form a core of cooperators. They respect the traffic rules strictly,
and we intend to study their effect in the dynamics. After the
system has reached a stationary state they are randomly chosen,
set as cooperators, and will not change their strategy for the re-
maining course of the run. They represent a set of drivers who
have been educated to abide by the law, disregarding the behav-
ior of the rest of the system. We are interested in the reaction of
the system as a whole, as a result of the imitation of strategies,
and its dependence on the size of this core of cooperation.
As a global measure of the influence of the core we define
a coefficient:
∆v = va− vb
vb
, (7)
where vb and va are respectively the average system veloci-
ties calculated before and after the establishment of the core.
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Figure 4 shows the effect of the core size on ∆v for different
vehicle densities. It is clear that the existence of the core of
cooperators represents a benefit for the system as a whole, in
terms of the velocity of the traffic flow. Moreover, the growth
of ∆v is monotonous, without any indication of a transition for
some critical core size. This behavior is very general, and we
have checked it for a wide range of model parameters.
The meaning of this result may be important for the design
of education plans. It implies that not only it is necessary to
educate and convince as many drivers as possible of the im-
portance of the respect of the rules, but also that the imitation
of behavior does not produce a collective critical turnover of a
defective system.
Observe, also, that the actual value of the growth of perfor-
mance may be sometimes dubious, since the growth of veloc-
ity can be marginal in some situations, particularly for low and
high densities of traffic. This is an indication that other mea-
sures are necessary to achieve specific goals of traffic fluidity,
besides the education of a core of drivers.
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Fig. 4. Coefficient ∆v, measuring the increase of the system velocity
after the introduction of a core of cooperators, versus the relative size
of the core in the population. The curves show the behavior for differ-
ent values of the vehicle density δ , as shown in the legend. The initial
fraction of cooperators in the system is 25% in all cases. The cost pa-
rameters are a = 3, b = 100. Data are averaged over 100 realizations.
As a final comment on Fig. 4, observe that the increase of
the velocity is not monotonous in the density: the greatest val-
ues of ∆v correspond to intermediate values of δ . To show this
dependence we plot, in Fig. 5, ∆v as a function of δ for a sin-
gle value of the core size, fCC = 0.5. The plot shows that the
increase of the average velocities of the system are greater near
and in excess of 0.5 occupancy of the lattice. Moreover, greater
penalties on defector drivers entail a substantial improvement
of these average speeds in the system.
4 Conclusions
We studied a cellular automata model of vehicular traffic based
on game theory. Our simple model assumes that only two be-
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Fig. 5. Coefficient ∆v as a function of vehicle density, for different
costs of the interaction between defectors. The other parameters are
a = 3 and fCC = 0.5. Error bars represent the mean square deviation
of the data in 100 realizations.
haviors are possible: drivers either respect or ignore the rule
that gives priority to the vehicle driving on the right. The two
classical strategies of two-strategies formal games—cooperation
and defection—are immediately associated with those. In our
framework, pairs of drivers can interact at crossings where each
vehicle pay a temporal cost according to its strategy.
We studied first the average velocity achieved in systems
with different and fixed proportions of cooperators and defec-
tors. We found that the velocity decreases monotonically with
density, driving away the possibility of a sharp transition at
any traffic density. Even for high vehicle densities, the average
speed of cooperators is greater than that of defectors, indepen-
dently of what strategy is a majority in the population. This
seems to imply that cooperators always benefit when abiding
by the law. However, in a population essentially cooperative,
defectors can exploit this situation for their own benefit, ob-
taining higher speeds than those achieved when the population
is essentially defective.
Additionally, we introduced a dynamic of imitation. Each
driver—at a slower time scale than the update of the state of
the system—can change their strategy with a probability calcu-
lated from their perception of the strategy of those they meet at
the crossroads. This imitation represents the attitude of drivers
who have not received a proper education in traffic rules; in-
stead, they try to adjust their behavior to that of the rest of
the system. We have explored the effect of establishing a core
of law-abiding drivers in this environment, in the form of a
sub-population of cooperators that do not change their behav-
ior during the dynamical evolution.
The existence of a core of cooperators represent a bene-
fit for the whole system, in the sense that higher speeds are
achieved. This benefit is gradual and continuous in its depen-
dence on the size of the core set. That is, the combination of the
core together with the emulation attitude provided by the dy-
namic of imitation, does not produce a critical turnover of a de-
fecting system. This is a point to take into consideration in the
formulation of driver’s education programs (even for drivers
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that already have a permit or license) or road safety campaigns.
Remarkably, this benefit reaches a maximum at intermediate
densities of traffic, and it is greater when the penalties impose
higher costs. The results are very general in the simple model
reported in the present work, which tries to capture a set of
minimal important details of the actual system. They will be
further explored with the addition of more complex rules and
interactions in future investigations. Moreover, some of the dy-
namical features observed in the model could be considered as
suggestions for field observations.
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